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Abstract
Electricity interconnection has been recognized as a way to mitigate carbon
emissions by dispatching more efficient electricity production and accommodating
the growing share of renewables. I analyze the impact of electricity interconnec-
tion in the presence of intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar power, on
renewable capacity and carbon emissions using a two-country model. I find that
in the first-best, interconnection decreases investments in renewable capacity and
exacerbates carbon emissions if the social cost of carbon (SCC) is low. Conversely,
interconnection increases renewable capacity and reduces carbon emissions for a
high SCC. Moreover, the intermittency of renewables generates an insurance gain
from interconnection, which also implies that some renewable capacity is optimally
curtailed in some states of nature when the SCC is high. The curtailment rate and
the corresponding carbon emissions increase for more positively correlated intermit-
tency. I calibrate the model using data from the European Union electricity market
and simulate the outcome of expanding interconnection between Germany-Poland
and France-Spain. I find that given the current level of SCC, the interconnection
may increase carbon emissions. The net benefit of interconnection is positive, with
uneven distribution across countries.
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1 Introduction
Renewable energy plays an essential role in decarbonizing the power sector. The Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global renewable capacity will grow by over
50% by 2023 (IEA 2018). Intermittent energy sources that come on and off depending on
the prevailing weather conditions, such as wind or solar energy, account for more than
80% of this growth. The intermittency imposes risks on the power system, which must
instantaneously balance supply and demand at all times. Electricity interconnection, or
cross-border transmission, is recognized as one of the solutions to this issue (Bahar and
Sauvage 2013).1
Electricity interconnection allows for the international exchange of electricity. This trade
opportunity has several established benefits. First, similar to other tradable goods, inter-
national trade harnesses varying comparative advantages in electricity production across
countries, which can lower prices to consumers through improved production efficiency.
Second, trade can facilitate the penetration of renewables to regions with insufficient
renewable resources or technology, thereby enhancing the potential to lower carbon diox-
ide (CO2) emissions. A third benefit that is unique to electricity trading, especially in
the case of uncertainty associated with renewable production, is the additional motive
of insuring against local supply shocks.2 In particular, interconnection can serve as a
backup for renewables with the importation of controllable thermal energy (e.g. coal,
gas) constantly available to generate power, or it can utilize the imperfect correlation of
renewable production across space.
The potential benefits on top of the infrastructural cost have led governments to expand
electricity interconnection. The European Commission is implementing a policy to in-
crease electricity interconnection from the current level of less than 10% to 15% of the
total installed capacity by 2030 (European Commission 2018). China, Japan, South Ko-
rea, Russia, and Mongolia have also been working together to construct the Asia Super
Grid (ASG), which would utilize the abundant renewable resources in Mongolia and dras-
tically reduce carbon emissions (Mano et al. 2014). With the potential implementations
of interconnection policies, we now need more than ever to understand how interconnec-
tion affects the adoption of technologies and capacity investment. More importantly, can
these policies always deliver positive outcomes in response to climate change?
1 Other ways to solve the problem of intermittency include demand-side responses and grid-level
storage facilities. For example, Moura and De Almeida (2010) analyze the impact of demand-side man-
agement and demand response on the integration of the growing intermittent resources in Portugal.
Suberu et al. (2014) review different energy storage systems and their advantage in mitigating intermit-
tency. In this paper, I focus the analysis only on interconnection.
2 Antweiler (2016) is the first to build a model of two-way electricity trade and refers to the insurance
motive as “reciprocal load smoothing” for stochastic demand variations.
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To answer this question, I construct a two-country model of optimal electricity production
with renewable intermittency and trade. Each country can be either a Clean type (that
has both fully controllable thermal and intermittent renewable technology) or a Dirty
type (that has only thermal technology). The countries coordinate by choosing their
consumption levels, installed capacities, and state-dependent output levels and trade
quantities so their joint social welfare is maximized. This model captures all of the
interconnection benefits and allows me to identify additional trade-offs in interconnection
regarding renewable capacity and carbon emissions.
Several takeaways arise from the theoretical analysis. First, consider the case where
the two interconnected countries are of one Clean and one Dirty type, and the Dirty
country has an absolute advantage over thermal production. In this case, expanding
interconnection has ambiguous effects on carbon emissions, depending on the level of
the social cost of carbon (SCC). If the SCC is low (high), interconnection exacerbates
(reduces) carbon emissions. The intuition lies in the fact that transmission is a two-
way street and facilitates not only renewable diffusion when the wind is blowing, or the
sun is shining, but also the dispersion of cheaper thermal production when generation
backup is needed. With a low SCC, interconnection gives the Clean country access to a
lower-cost thermal technology, which would decrease its adoption of renewables (reverse
technique effect). In addition, the optimal consumption in the Clean country increases
with opening up, because of the cheaper backup thermal energy (scale effect). Both the
scale and the reverse technique effect push emissions upward. However, with a high SCC,
interconnection expands the market of Clean country renewables, which are now less
costly than thermal energy (technique effect). The technique effect and scale effect take
opposite directions, and depending on which effect dominates, emissions can increase or
decrease.
Second, if both countries are of the Clean type and differ only in the occurrence of the
intermittent states, renewable curtailment, i.e., having idle renewable capacity or dispos-
ing of renewable generated electricity, may be optimal in some states. Interconnection
kicks in as insurance against intermittency when the wind in one country dies and is
still blowing in the other country. For the country in which the wind is still blowing to
export electricity, they must have a renewable capacity exceeding local demand. This
excess supply becomes idle when the wind is blowing in both countries. The curtail-
ment rate and the corresponding carbon emissions depend positively on the correlation
of occurrence of their windy states. The more positively correlated, the more likely some
capacity stays idle and the higher the carbon emissions, all else being equal. Therefore,
not allowing for curtailment reduces the capacity that can be installed, undermining any
insurance motive of interconnection, and trade will not take place in any state of nature.
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To quantify the scale of the effect from the theoretical model, I simulate the Germany-
Poland (DE-PL) and France-Spain (FR-ES) interconnections to represent the Clean-Dirty
and Clean-Clean case, respectively. For the FR-ES interconnection, I also simulate FR
wind-ES wind and FR wind-ES solar separately, to explore the effect of intermittency
correlation. The four countries represent four distinctive energy profiles: Germany has
various types of coal and renewables; Poland is predominantly powered by coal; France
has over 70% nuclear with gas and wind power; and Spain has a mix of nuclear, thermal,
and renewables. The four countries are also geographically connected and have existing
transmission lines in use. Therefore, understanding the impact of existing transmission
capacity is important in the representative European Union (EU) context. Moreover,
the simulation results can be generalized to any country or region with a similar energy
profile.
Simulation results show that achieving the EU’s 2030 interconnection target under an
SCC of €45 per ton of CO2 increases annual emission by 1.69% in the DE-PL case, by
1.74% in the FR wind-ES wind case, and reduces emission by 7.18% in the FR wind-ES
solar case, all in comparison with the status quo. Compared to the binding target of
cutting emission by 43% in the EU power sector by 2030, interconnection can contribute
a range from -5 to 23% of the target. I then conduct a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) for
expanding interconnection capacities. The BCA shows that although transmission lines
require a high upfront investment, the life-time benefit outweighs the cost. However, the
net benefit is unevenly distributed across countries. For instance, in the DE-PL case,
Germany obtains 100% of the net gain from a 5300 MW interconnection and Poland
acquires none. The net importer (Germany) captures all the net benefit because of its
increased consumer surplus and avoided investment cost of wind capacity. This uneven
distribution could shed light on how the interconnection investment cost should be shared.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. The most related is the growing
theoretical literature on electricity production with intermittent renewables. Ambec and
Crampes (2012) construct a model which characterizes the optimal energy mix between
the controllable source and the intermittent source and analyze the market structure to
decentralize the optimal mix. The literature also analyzes issues including how different
policy instruments, demand-side response, and storage technology affect the optimal en-
ergy mix with renewable intermittency (Ambec and Crampes 2012; 2019, Helm and Mier
2019). However, the literature has ignored issues related to electricity transportation and
distribution in energy transmission, i.e., congestion and grid design. This paper builds on
the model of Ambec and Crampes (2012; 2019) to consider how electricity interconnection
affects the optimal energy mix, and consequently its effect on carbon emissions.
This paper is also related to the theoretical literature on electricity transmission. Joskow
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and Tirole (2000; 2005) consider an electricity transmission model and study how the
allocation of transmission rights affects market power and investment incentives on trans-
mission lines. In the absence of intermittency, the trade flow always goes in one direction
in equilibrium. I consider transmission with intermittent renewables which leads to re-
ciprocal trading. Other theoretical models that study the gains from electricity trade
consider stochastic demand (Antweiler 2016) or seasonal supply variations (Von Der Fehr
and Sandsbråten 1997).3 In these papers, the gains from electricity trade are on the inten-
sive margin as production capacities are exogenous. In contrast, I endogenize capacities
to also look at the extensive marginal gains from trade with particular attention given
to renewable penetration. There is also a growing empirical literature on estimating the
gains from electricity trade and the social value of renewables (Abrell and Rausch 2016;
Cullen 2013; Gowrisankaran et al. 2016; LaRiviere and Lu 2018). This paper supple-
ments the literature by identifying the key determinants of the social value of trade with
intermittent renewables.
Moreover, this paper contributes to the extensive literature on the effect of trade on the
environment. Openness to the international goods market can have a direct and indirect
impact on a country’s environment. Antweiler et al. (2001) is the first to provide a
theoretical framework that decomposes the impact of trade on the environment into a
scale, technique, and composition effect. Depending on the environmental aspect (e.g.,
pollution, biodiversity) and countries, empirical estimates of the overall effect can be
either positive or negative (Antweiler et al. 2001; Copeland and Taylor 2004; Curtis et al.
2014; Hauch 2003; Managi et al. 2009; WTO-UNEP 2009). This paper fits into this
literature by decomposing the scale and technique effect of electricity trading on carbon
emissions.4 The calibrated simulation also provides suggestive evidence on the magnitude
of the effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup. Section 3 presents
the benchmark case of countries under autarky. Section 4 provides a theoretical analysis
of the Clean-Dirty and Clean-Clean interconnection in the first-best. Section 5 presents
the calibrated simulation exercise and benefit-cost analysis, and Section 6 provides a final
overview.
3 Another way to model renewable intermittency is by looking at the demand net of renewable
production. Thus, Antweiler (2016) implicitly models intermittency through demand variations.
4 There is no composition effect in the case of electricity trading as electricity is a homogeneous good.
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2 The Model
I build upon the work of Ambec and Crampes (2012) and Joskow and Tirole (2000) and
construct a stylized model of electricity trade. Interconnection takes place between two
countries (or regions); each can be of the Clean type (c) or the Dirty type (d). I solve
the special case of symmetric countries analytically if they are of the same type. In the
simulation, I consider the more general cases of asymmetric countries.
Electricity production
On the supply side, electricity can be generated from two technologies: a fully controllable
polluting thermal power f (e.g., coal, gas) and an intermittent clean renewable energy
source i (e.g., wind, solar). The Clean country has both technologies available, whereas
the Dirty country has only thermal power. The market is fully competitive for both
technologies.
For the thermal power, the installed capacityKjf (j ∈ {c, d}) has a constant unit capacity
cost rf . The fuel and operational cost of producing qjf kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity
is κj, if it does not exceed the installed capacity. The Dirty country is assumed to have
an absolute advantage in thermal production (κd < κc). The electricity produced by
thermal power emits carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. The SCC normalized
for each unit of electricity produced is denoted δ.5 Therefore, the total environmental
damage of thermal electricity production is δ ∗ qjf and the total emission is equal to the
total production from the thermal power E = qjf .
For the intermittent renewables, the total cost of installing capacityKi is f(Ki), where f is
an increasing and convex function (f ′ > 0, f ′′ > 0). The marginal capacity cost is denoted
as ri ≡ f ′(Ki), and ri ∈ [ri,+∞) for Ki ∈ [0, K¯]. The assumption of a convex cost of
renewable capacity can be justified by the uneven distribution of wind and solar energy
across the terrain of a country. The wind and solar farms are installed first in the areas
with the highest wind and solar power density and subsequently installed in locations
with a lower hourly yield.The production of renewables depends on the prevailing weather
conditions. There are two states of nature s ∈ {l, h} with high (h) and low (l) renewables
output. In the high state, renewables can generate output at full capacity, and the
marginal production cost is normalized to zero. In the low state, the renewables are
inactive, with zero output. The two states occur with the exogenous probabilities νj and
5 The analysis can also be adapted to other pollutants, such as SO2 and NOX . However, since these
pollutants create local rather than global environmental damages, the social cost is thus localized. The
literature on the pollution haven effect (e.g., Copeland and Taylor (1994)) focuses on discussing of local
pollutants.
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1 − νj respectively, which capture the degree of intermittency of the renewables.6 Note
that for the Dirty country νd = 0 and for the Clean country νc = ν, ν ∈ (0, 1).
Across two Clean countries, there are jointly four states of nature as shown in the table
below.
Clean
Clean h, h h, l ν
l, h l, l 1− ν
ν 1− ν
The correlation factor of the joint Bernoulli distribution is denoted as ρ ∈ [−1, 1], with
ρ = 1 indicating perfect positive correlation and ρ = −1 for perfect negative correlation.
The joint probabilities of the states are thus σhh = ν2 + ρν(1− ν), σhl = σlh = ν − σhh,
σll = 1− ν − σhl.
Electricity consumption
On the demand side, consumers in each country derive gross utility S(Qj) from the
consumption of Qj kWh of electricity. S(·) is continuous and twice differentiable with
S ′ > 0 and S ′′ < 0. S ′(0) is assumed to be large so that it is always efficient to have
some electricity consumption. The demand function is D(pj) = S ′−1(pj), where pj stands
for the retail price in country j. Throughout the paper, I assume that consumers are
subject to contracts that do not allow for state-contingent retail prices. Consumers thus
have non-state-contingent demand Qhj = Qlj.7 Moreover, rationing is not allowed; i.e.,
there can be no partial blackouts. Therefore, the supply must satisfy a constant demand,
independent of the state. However, in the wholesale market, price is state-dependent
denoted by psj .
Electricity trade
The interconnected countries can import or export electricity up to the capacity limit
Kt of the transmission lines. However, at any given time, the net electric current flows
in one direction, and the net flow quantity is denoted by xs (s ∈ {h, l}). Throughout
the paper, transmission line losses are assumed to be zero.8 Moreover, I assume that the
transmission operation market is perfectly competitive. Thus, electricity is always traded
6 νj can also be interpreted as the load factor of renewable energy production.
7 In reality, most electricity contracts offered to consumers are with a fixed unit price or a tier-pricing
depending on the quantities consumed. The retail price does not change with the spot price on the
wholesale market and demand is thus independent of how electricity is produced.
8 This is without loss of generality as the direction of the results will not be affected, but the scale
may be dampened. In the benefit-cost analysis, this assumption is relaxed.
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at the wholesale prices.
The social planner solves a two-stage problem. In the first stage, she chooses the thermal
and renewable capacities and fixes the retail price for consumers. In the second stage,
consumers decide on the consumption level, given the retail prices. Producers bid at
marginal cost for electricity generation depending on the realization of the states of
nature. The social planner then decides on how much the grid takes from each technology
subject to the merit-order effect.9 Since there is no uncertainty in the probability of the
states of nature, the solution for this two-stage problem is equivalent to a static model
where the social planner maximizes the expected social welfare. The social planner’s
objective function for country j is thus:
W (Qj, q
h
jf , q
l
jf , Kjf , Ki;κj, νj) = S(Qj)−(κj+δ)(νjqhjf+(1−νj)qljf )−rfKjf−f(Ki) (1)
Note that the first-best allocation can be decentralized as a competitive market equilib-
rium, if there is a Pigouvian carbon tax equal to the SCC. The tax allows the thermal
producers to fully internalize the social damage of carbon emissions, which in turn restore
the first-best.
3 The Autarky Case
As a benchmark, consider that both countries are under autarky (Figure 1) and the social
planner solves the welfare maximization problem for each type of country.
Figure 1: Illustration of countries under autarky
Clean
f & i
Dirty
f
For the Clean type, in state h, renewables can be produced at the maximum installed
capacity Ki. Given the merit-order effect of electricity dispatch, renewable power is fully
fed into the grid since its marginal production cost is zero. Thermal power is also available
9 The merit-order is the ranking of energy sources by their short-run marginal cost and production
capacity. To minimize production cost, the sources with the lowest marginal costs are those first utilized
to meet electricity demand (Sensfuß et al. 2008).
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as a supplementary source to meet demand. In state l when the wind is not blowing or the
sun is not shining, the thermal power kicks in as generation backup. Thus, Qc = Ki+ qhcf
in the state h and Qc = qlcf in the state l. Since capacity is costly, an idle capacity that is
not used in any state is strictly inefficient. The capacity of thermal power must be equal
to its production in the peak state, Kcf = qlcf . The social planner chooses Qc, Ki, Kcf ,
and qhcf for the Clean type, subject to the non-state-contingent demand and production
feasibility constraints.
max
Qc, Ki, Kcf , q
h
cf
W (Qc, q
h
cf , Kcf , Ki;κc, ν)
s.t. Ki + q
h
cf = Qc
Kcf = Qc
Kcf ≥ qhcf ≥ 0
Ki ≥ 0
(2)
In the Appendix A.1 I derive the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The optimal installed capacities, production and electricity consumption in
the Clean type under autarky (super-scripted A) are
i If δ ≤ δA, only thermal energy is producing in both states. qhAcf = KAcf = QAc =
D(κc + δ + rf ), and KAi = 0. δA = riν − κc.
ii If δA < δ ≤ δ¯A, then both thermal and renewables produce in the state h. KAcf =
QA = D(κc + δ + rf ), KAi = f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)), qhAf = QAc − KAi . The threshold δ¯A
satisfies f ′−1(ν(κc + δ¯A)) = D(κc + δ¯A + rf ).
iii If δ > δ¯A, then only renewables produce in the state h. KAcf = QAc = D((1− ν)(κc+
δ) + r˜Ai + rf ), KAi = QAc , and qhAcf = 0, where r˜Ai = f ′(KAi ).10
Lemma 1 is similar to Ambec and Crampes (2012, Proposition 1) and is illustrated in
Figure 2. The characterization of the first-best optimum critically depends on the SCC.11
In case i, it is cost-inefficient to have renewable capacity installed. Thermal power runs
in both states to meet demand. In case ii, renewable energy is installed but the capacity
is lower than the consumption level. Thermal power supplements renewable production
in state h. In case iii, renewable production in state h can meet full demand, so the
10r˜Ai denotes the marginal cost of the least efficient renewable capacity installed.
11 The threshold conditions can be interpreted in different ways. Throughout this paper, the discussion
is focused on the implications of the variation in δ. Analogous interpretations can also be drawn from
the perspective of the capacity cost of renewable energy (ri), the load factor level (ν), or the marginal
fuel cost of thermal power (κ).
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thermal power is only used as a backup in state l. Consumption in this case is higher
than with only thermal power.
Figure 2: Optimal capacities, production, and consumption under autarky
Capacities, Consumption
δ0 δA δ¯A
qhAcf
KAiK
A
cf , QAc KAdf , QAd
i ii iii
It can be seen that that in Lemma 1 the optimal consumption equals demand at the
retail price equivalent to the expected long-run marginal cost (pc = κc + δ + rf in case i
and ii, and pc = (1− ν)(κc + δ) + r˜Ai + rf in case iii). Thus the market-clearing price in
each state should be equal to the long-run marginal cost (phc = κc+ δ in case i and ii, and
phc =
r˜Ai
ν
in case iii; and plc = κc+ δ+ rf1−ν ). phc and plc yield the familiar off-peak and peak
prices from the peak-load pricing literature (Williamson 1966). In state h, renewables
are at their peak and thermal is at its off-peak, whereas in state l, thermal energy is at
its peak. Therefore, with a Pigouvian carbon tax equal to the SCC, the state-contingent
prices phc and plc can implement the first-best energy mix.
For the Clean type, the expected carbon emissions follow directly from Lemma 1 and are
illustrated in Figure 3. In case i, emissions are one to one with consumption. In case ii,
with the joint operation of renewables and thermal energy in state h, the emissions are
consumption net of the partial renewable production in state h. In case iii, emissions
accounts only for the consumption in state l.
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Figure 3: Carbon emissions under autarky
Emissions
δ0 δA δ¯A
EAc E
A
d
i ii iii
The Dirty type, with only thermal power, has no problem of intermittency. Essentially,
its maximization problem is a special case of the problem of the Clean type, with νd = 0
and Ki = 0. The optimal thermal capacity and consumption level are analogous to case
i of of Lemma 1 and is illustrated in Figure 2.
Note that the Dirty type has a higher optimal consumption level than the Clean type,
given its cost advantage in thermal production. However, this cost advantage diminishes
for a high SCC, as the consumption in the Clean country decreases at a slower rate with
respect to the SCC.
4 Electricity Interconnection
In this section, I consider electricity interconnection between two countries. More specif-
ically, I separate two cases: Clean-Dirty interconnection and Clean-Clean interconnec-
tion.12 This separation is justified by the inherent differences in the national energy mix
across countries. For example, over 80% of Poland’s electricity is generated from coal,
and Germany has a mix of nuclear, coal, gas, and renewables. France’s electricity is pre-
dominantly generated by nuclear power, supplemented by gas and renewables, and Spain
has an even mix of wind, solar and gas. Therefore, connecting Germany and Poland may
have implications that differ from connecting France and Spain. By analyzing the two
12 The case of Dirty-Dirty interconnection is not interesting under the assumption of symmetric types.
Trade will not take place since there is no comparative advantage in either country.
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cases separately, the characteristics of renewable generation, namely intermittency and
imperfect correlation, can be made more salient.
4.1 The Clean-Dirty interconnection
In the case of Clean-Dirty interconnection (Figure 4), trade affects the two countries in
different ways. For the Clean country, it now has access to a cheaper backup thermal
power. For the Dirty country, it can potentially import clean electricity in state h. The
Dirty country is now indirectly intermittent because of trade.
Figure 4: Illustration of electricity interconnection between a Clean and a Dirty country
KtClean
f & i
Dirty
f
The merit order in each country changes depending on the production availability in each
state, and the exogenous transmission constraint Kt, as shown in Figure 5. In state h,
the Clean country first dispatches the renewable generation at marginal cost 0 up to the
renewable capacity Ki. Then it dispatches the cheaper thermal power imported from the
Dirty country up to the transmission constraint Kt at a marginal cost κd+ δ. Its thermal
production meets the residual demand at a marginal cost κc + δ. Analogies can be made
for state l and the Dirty country. Note that no country can simultaneously import and
export in a given state.
Figure 5: Merit order of the Clean and Dirty interconnection
Marginal cost
κc + δ
κd + δ
0
Ki Ki +KtKt
h l
(a) Clean
Marginal cost
κc + δ
κd + δ
0
Kt Kdf Kt +Kdf
h l
(b) Dirty
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With interconnection, the social planner maximizes the joint social welfare choosing the
optimal levels of consumption Qj, production qhjf , capacities Kjf , Ki and trading quan-
tities xs for both countries.13 Compared to the autarky setting, demand in each country
is now satisfied with their own country’s production net of trade. In state l, electricity
always flows from Dirty to Clean since κd < κc. In state h, the trade flow can be in either
direction depending on whether excess renewable capacity is available. The transmission
capacity caps the quantity traded. The first-best maximization problem is solved subject
to the non-state-contingent demand, production feasibility, and transmission capacity
constraints.
max
Qj ,Kjf ,q
h
jf ,Ki,x
s
j∈{c,d},s∈{h,l}
W (Qc, q
h
cf , Kcf , Ki;κc, ν) +W (Qd, q
h
df , Kdf ;κd, ν)
s.t. Ki + q
h
cf − xh = Qc
Kcf + x
l = Qc
qhdf + x
h = Qd
Kdf − xl = Qd
0 ≤ qhjf ≤ Kjf ∀j ∈ {c, d}
Ki ≥ 0
−min{Kt, Qc} ≤ xh ≤ min{Kt, Qd}
xl ≤ min{Kt, Qc}
(3)
In the Appendix A.2 I derive the following lemma:14
Lemma 2. (Free trade optimality) The optimal installed capacities, production and elec-
tricity consumption in the Clean and Dirty country when Kt is not binding (super-scripted
F ) are
i If δ ≤ δF , the Dirty country produces with thermal power in both states. QFc =
QFd = D(κd + δ + rf ), KFdf = qhFdf = QFc + QFd , qhFcf = KFcf = 0, and KFi = 0.
δF =
ri
ν
− κd. Trade flow in both states are from Dirty to Clean and equal QFc .
ii If δF < δ ≤ δ¯F , the Clean country produces with renewables and the Dirty country
supplements the production with thermal power in state h. Also, the Dirty country
produces with full thermal capacity in state l. QFc = QFd = D(κd + δ + rf ), KFdf =
QFc + Q
F
d , KFi = f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)), qhFdf = KFdf − KFi , and qhFcf = KFcf = 0. The
threshold δ¯F satisfies f ′−1(ν(κd + δ¯F )) = 2D(κd + δ¯F + rf ). The trade flow in state
h can be in either direction and xh = Ki −Qc.
13 Recall that qhjf = Kjf holds even with trade.
14The full analysis for constrained transmission is in Appendix A.8.
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iii If δ > δ¯F , then only the Clean country produces with renewables in state h, and the
Dirty country produces only in state l. QFc = QFd = D((1− ν)(κd + δ) + rf + r˜Fi ),
where r˜Fi = f ′(KFi ), KFdf = KFi = QFc +QFd , and qhFcf = qhFdf = KFcf = 0. The trade
flow in state h is from Clean to Dirty xh = QFd .
Proposition 1 follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 (proof in Appendix A.3).
Proposition 1. For the Clean-Dirty interconnection, in the first-best, comparing free
trade to autarky,
i all thermal production and capacity shift to the Dirty country;
ii ∃ δˆ ∈ (δ¯A, δ¯F ), such that renewable capacity decreases if δ < δˆ, and increases if
δ > δˆ;
iii the consumption level weakly increases in the Dirty country; ∃ δ˚ > δˆ, such that
consumption in the Clean country increases if δ < δ˚, and decreases if δ > δ˚;
iv ∃ δ˜ ∈ (δˆ, δ¯F ), such that carbon emissions increase if δ < δ˜, and decrease if δ > δ˜.
Optimal consumption and capacities
Proposition 1.i describes the concentration of thermal power in the Dirty country. This
result is driven by the cost advantage of thermal production in the Dirty country. Because
the marginal cost of thermal production is constant, efficiency requires that the Dirty
country specializes in thermal power, and the Clean country holds no thermal capacity.
This result need not hold if the marginal cost is convex.15 However, it is still safe to
conclude that thermal power is more concentrated in the Dirty country under free trade
than under autarky (Figure 6b).
Proposition 1.ii implies that the renewable capacity under free trade can be lower or
higher than autarky, depending on the SCC. Figure 6a illustrates this result. In case ii,
where the Clean country builds renewable capacity under autarky, there is zero renewable
under free trade. This is because when the transmission constraint is not binding, the two
countries can be considered as one open market. Thus, the renewable capacity is installed
if and only if its long run marginal capacity cost is lower than the Dirty country’s marginal
thermal production cost. In other words, opening to trade increases the SCC threshold
for installing renewable capacity. In cases iii and iv, although there is some renewable
15 If the marginal cost of thermal production is convex, depending on the respective cost functions in
the two countries, the Clean country may have some or no thermal capacity. Since a convex marginal cost
adds another layer of complexity and brings little additional insight, I abstract from the cost convexity.
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Figure 6: Optimal capacities and consumption under autarky and free trade
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capacity under free trade, it is strictly lower than that under autarky. It follows that the
marginal cost of the last unit of renewable capacity under autarky is strictly higher than
that under free trade (r˜Ai = ν(κc+ δ) > ν(κd+ δ) = r˜Fi ). On the other hand, with a high
SCC, renewables can be installed to meet the consumption of both countries under free
trade, whereas it is efficient to meet only the consumption of the Clean country under
autarky. Therefore, free trade at high SCC facilitates the diffusion of renewables. The
policy implication is that expanding interconnection does not necessarily leads to more
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renewables at the optimum.
Figure 6a and 6b also exhibit the optimal consumption levels in the Clean and Dirty
country respectively. The Dirty country has a higher consumption level under free trade if
and only if δ > δ¯F . In other words, when their demand in state h is fully met by imported
renewables, the slope of their optimal consumption is smaller than under autarky. The
situation for the Clean country is more complex. At a low SCC, the Clean country has a
strictly higher consumption level under trade, because of the lowered cost in state l from
importing. At a higher SCC, the Clean country may have a lower consumption given
trade because of the increased investment in renewables. Since the cost of renewable
capacity is increasing and convex, the excess capacity for export drives up the marginal
cost. When the increase in the cost of renewables outweighs the decrease in that of
thermal power, the optimal consumption may decrease compared to autarky.
Retail and wholesale prices
A global Pigouvian carbon tax can decentralize the optimal investment and consumption
levels as a competitive market equilibrium. Under free trade, the absence of network
congestion equalizes both the wholesale and retail prices in the two markets. Similar to
the autarky case, the retail price equals the expected wholesale price in each state. The
wholesale prices reflect the long-run marginal cost of the peak-load technology in the
respective states (renewables in the state h and thermal in the state l). plus the marginal
fuel cost and social damage from carbon emissions.
Figure 7 compares the free trade and autarky retail and wholesale prices. It is straight-
forward that in both cases, the wholesale price in state l is monotonically increasing in
the SCC and is lower under free trade. The wholesale prices in state h first increase in
the SCC, as more renewable capacities are installed, and then decreases as consumptions
decrease and lower renewable capacity is needed. Moreover, the prices are not always
lower under free trade than under autarky. At the threshold δˆ, their wholesale prices
and renewable capacities are equal. Since the retail price is a linear combination of the
wholesale prices, depending on the probabilities of the states, the free trade price may
be lower or higher than that under autarky. The inverse relationship is reflected in the
consumption levels.
On carbon emissions
The effect of free trade on carbon emissions is decomposed into the scale and technique
effects (Antweiler et al. 2001). The scale effect refers to the increase in the consumption
level in the relevant jurisdiction. The technique effect refers to the change in aggregate
pollution arising from a switch to less pollution-intensive production technology. Net
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Figure 7: The retail and wholesale prices under free trade and autarky
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emissions are denoted as ∆E = EF − EA, where EA =
∑
j,s q
sA
jf to EF =
∑
j,s q
sF
jf . The
net emissions change depending on the SCC, as shown below:
∆E =

QFc −QAc︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale +
> 0 if δ ≤ δA
QFc −QAc︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale +
+ νKAi︸︷︷︸
technique +
> 0 if δA < δ ≤ δF
QFc −QAc︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale +
− ν(KFi −KAi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
technique + −
≥ 0 if δF < δ ≤ δ˜
QFd −QAd +QFc −QAc︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale + −
− ν(KFi −KAi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
technique -
< 0 if δ ≥ δ˜
(4)
Opening to trade allows the Clean country to import cheaper thermal power from the
Dirty country, which both increases electricity consumption and reduces the social value
to build local renewable capacities. If the SCC is lower than δ˜, carbon emissions under
free trade increase compared to autarky, which is due to the scale effect and the (reverse)
technique effect going in the same direction to increase carbon emissions. However, when
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the SCC is higher than δ˜, the technique effect of increased renewables offsets the scale
effect of increased consumption, which leads to an overall decrease in carbon emissions
(Figure 8). Note that when δ > δ¯F , ∂∆E
∂δ
> 0. This is because the aggregate consumption
level decreases more slowly with respect to the SCC under free trade than under autarky.
A very high SCC may exist such that net emission becomes positive.
Figure 8: Net carbon emissions when comparing free trade to autarky Note: ∆E = EF − EA
∆E
δ
0
δA δ˜δF δ¯F
Proposition 1 arises from the fact that interconnection helps the diffusion of both renew-
ables and thermal power. Depending on the SCC, either renewables or thermal power
is more cost-efficient in generating electricity. Although expanding interconnection can
always increase market efficiency, regarding deepening the penetration of renewables and
reducing carbon emissions, the result is mixed.16
4.2 The Clean-Clean interconnection
Now let us consider interconnecting two Clean countries that are symmetric except for
the occurrence of the high and low renewable states (Figure 9). The unique aspect of this
case is the imperfect correlation of wind and solar generation. Therefore, interconnecting
two Clean countries reduces the variability of renewables and has the potential to decrease
carbon emissions.17 In the case of France and Spain, both countries have solar and on-
shore wind generation. Annual production shows that in 2016 the correlations of their
solar production was 0.88, which is higher than that of their wind production (0.38), while
16This result has the same flavor as Lazkano et al. (2017). They find that storage boosts innovation
in both renewable and conventional electricity generation. This is because storage reduces not only the
intermittency of renewables, but also the ramping cost of conventional power plants.
17 MacDonald et al. (2016) simulated an 80% reduction of CO2 compared to the 1990 level for a US
market connected by high-voltage direct-current transmission with high wind and solar deployment.
18
the cross-correlations of solar and wind production is negative (-0.13). This observation
justifies the consideration of correlated states of nature, instead of simply regarding them
as independent.
Figure 9: Illustration of electricity interconnection between two clean countries
KtClean
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Clean
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Let us recall that the two countries jointly have four states of nature: (h, h), (h, l), (l, h),
and (l, l), with probabilities σhh = ν2 + ρν(1− ν), σhl = σlh = ν − σhh, σll = 1− ν − σhl
respectively. The generation possibilities in the corresponding states are
Clean Clean
h, h Ki, qhhf Ki, qhhf
h, l Ki, qhlf qlhf
l, h qlhf Ki,qlhf
l, l Kf Kf
Note that given the symmetric-countries assumption, trade is fully reciprocal and occurs
only if one country is in the high renewables state (l, h). I assume that free disposal of
renewable energy (i.e. curtailment) is allowed if the total capacity exceeds total demand.
max
Qc,qsf ,Ki,x
s∈{a,b,c}
2W (Qc, q
s
f , Kf , Ki, x;κc, ν, ρ)
s.t. qaf +Ki ≥ Qc
qbf + x = Qc
qcf +Ki − x = Qc
0 ≤ qsf ≤ Qc ∀s ∈ {a, b, c}
Ki ≥ 0
0 ≤ x ≤ min{Kt, Qc}
(5)
In the Appendix A.4 I derive the following lemma:
Lemma 3. The optimal installed capacities, production and electricity consumption in
the two Clean countries for any given Kt > 0 (super-scripted T ) are
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i If δ ≤ δA, there is no renewable capacity in either country and trade will not occur.
qsTf = Q
T
c = K
T
f = D(κc+ δ+ rf ) (s ∈ {a, b, c}), KTi = 0 and xT = 0. δA = riν −κc.
ii If δA < δ ≤ δ¯A, the renewable capacity can only satisfy partial local demand and
trade will not occur. QTc = KTf = D(κc + δ + rf ), qsTf = QTc − KTi , KTi =
f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)), and xT = 0. δ¯A solves f ′−1(ν(κc + δ¯A)) = D(κc + δ¯A + rf ).
iii If δ¯A < δ < δ¯T , the renewable capacity is equal to full local demand with excess supply
for export, but is lower than the transmission capacity. QTc = KTf = D(κc+ δ+ rf ),
qsTf = 0, KTi = f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)), and xT = KTi −QTc . Renewable curtailment occurs
in state (h, h) and equals xT . δ¯T solves f ′−1(ν(c+ δ¯T )) = D(c+ δ¯T + rf ) +Kt and
∂δ¯T
∂Kt
≥ 0.
iv If δ > δ¯T , renewable capacity is equal to full local demand plus the transmission
capacity. QTc = KTf = D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + r˜Ti ) if Kt < QTcQFc = KFf = D(σll(κc + δ) + rf + 2r˜Fi ) if Kt ≥ QTc
qsTf = 0, KTi = QTc + xT , r˜Ti = f ′(KTi ), r˜Fi = f ′(2QFc ) and xT = max{Kt, QTc }.
Renewable curtailment in state (h, h) equals Kt.
Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 (proof in Appendix A.5).
Proposition 2. For the Clean-Clean interconnection of two symmetric countries, in the
first-best, ∀ Kt > 0, if δ < δ¯A trade is equivalent to autarky; if δ > δ¯A, trade increases
renewable capacity, and decreases consumption and carbon emissions.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 10 with a comparison to the autarky case. It is
intuitive that renewable capacity increases with trade with a high SCC. Since the two
countries have not perfectly correlated renewable production, trade allows the countries
to export renewables in the (h, l) and (l, h) states. Therefore, countries invest in more
renewable capacity. But the excess capacity on top of their local demand is curtailed in
state (h, h).
The increased renewable capacity under trade leads to the second part of Proposition
2, that for δ > δˆ, interconnection decreases the optimal level of electricity consumption.
This counter-intuitive result is driven by the convex cost of renewable capacity. I turn
to the equilibrium wholesale prices to show the intuitions. Under constrained trade, the
equilibrium wholesale price in each state for the two countries are as shown below.
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Clean Clean
phh 0 0
phl
r˜Ti
σhl
κc + δ
plh κc + δ
r˜Ti
σlh
pll κc + δ +
rf
σll
κc + δ +
rf
σll
The expected retail price given the equilibrium wholesale prices is thus
pT =σhh ∗ 0 + σhl r˜
T
i
σhl
+ σlh(κc + δ) + σll
rf
σll
=(1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + r˜Ti
(6)
Compared to the autarky retail price for the Clean type, pA = (1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + r˜Ai ,
the only difference is the marginal cost of renewables. Therefore, all other things being
equal, higher renewable capacity under trade leads to a higher retail price, and hence
lower consumption level. This result holds true under free trade.
Figure 10: Optimal capacities and consumption for the Clean-Clean interconnection
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Proposition 2 shows that expanding interconnection decreases carbon emissions only when
coupled with high SCC. This is due to both the scale and technique effects of trade. For
a low SCC, the scale and technique effects are both zero, as consumption levels and
renewable capacity are not affected by an increase in transmission capacity. For a high
SCC, with increasing Kt, more renewable capacity can be installed and exported in state
(h, l), which also decreases the consumption level given the convex cost of renewables.
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Therefore, the scale and technique effects go in the same direction to reduce carbon
emission.
This following corollary regarding carbon emissions can be obtained (proof in Appendix
A.6).
Corollary 1. For a given level of SCC and transmission capacity, carbon emissions weakly
increase (resp. decrease) with more positively (resp. negatively) correlated intermittency.
Corollary 1 suggests that the reduction in carbon emissions is more pronounced if the
two interconnecting countries have more negatively correlated renewable production, e.g.,
interconnecting one country with solar PV and one country with wind. The intuition is
straightforward: more negatively correlated intermittency increases the probability of
only one country with renewable production, which decreases the curtailment rate of
renewable power and reduces output from thermal power.
Note that Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are true if and only if free disposal of renewables
is allowed. When curtailment is not allowed, e.g. a policy that forces all renewable
production to be taken by the grid, then for grid safety concerns, renewable capacity is
capped by the local demand. Therefore, it is inefficient to have a renewable capacity
larger than the consumption level of one country. In this symmetric case, there will be
no trade in any state and there can be no gains from interconnection. Not allowing for
curtailment completely undermines the insurance motive of interconnection, and results
in a lower social welfare level.
There are many empirical observations of renewable curtailment in the real electricity
markets (Bird et al. 2016). They are of great concerns as they potentially reflect market
inefficiency, overcapacity, strategic firm behavior, or inefficient policy designs.18 Although
curtailment may be inefficient under low shares of renewable power, the results in this
section show that with high share of renewable capacity, curtailment can be efficient
to achieve higher renewable penetration and carbon reduction. Naturally, curtailment
could be avoided if more countries are interconnected, especially to countries without
renewables, or through the deployment of grid-scale storage facilities (Loisel et al. 2010).
18 This concern is addressed by an extensive literature. For example, Fabra and Llobet (2019), Golden
and Paulos (2015), Kakhbod et al. (2019), and Luo et al. (2016).
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5 Calibrated Simulation
In this section, I calibrate the model using country-level electricity market data. I then
simulate the long-run equilibrium electricity consumption, wholesale prices, renewable
capacity, and carbon emissions for given levels of interconnection capacity and SCC.
Furthermore, I conduct a benefit-cost analysis, comparing the simulated gains from ad-
ditional transmission capacity with the investment cost of transmission lines.
5.1 Data source and calibration methodology
In the simulation, I relax the model assumption of symmetric demand and uniform capac-
ity cost for the interconnected countries and construct country-specific parameter values.
To estimate the parameters, I obtain data for the year 2016 from a variety of sources
specified below for two pairs of countries: Germany (DE) and Poland (PL), France (FR)
and Spain (ES).
The DE-PL interconnection represents the Clean-Dirty case. In 2016, 89% of Poland’s
total electricity generation came from fossil fuel sources while Germany had a mix of nu-
clear (14.9%), fossil (42.2%) and a substantial amount of intermittent renewables (20.5%).
Germany is also in the process of phasing out nuclear power and coal for generating elec-
tricity. Therefore, by looking at the interconnection of these two countries it is possible to
draw implications on how interconnection can facilitate or impede achieving these policy
targets, and also provide inferences on interconnection between other countries/regions
with similar energy profiles (e.g., China-Japan, California-Arizona).
The interconnection between France and Spain (FR-ES) represents the Clean-Clean case.
Electricity in France is predominantly generated by nuclear power plants (72.5%), with
the residual supply mainly from gas (6.8%) and intermittent renewables (5.2%). Spain
has a balanced mix of nuclear (22.5%), thermal (33.3%), and renewable (24%) power.
Although France and Spain are geographically close, their wind and solar generation are
imperfectly correlated. Their annual wind-wind, solar-solar, and wind-solar production
correlations are respectively 0.38, 0.88, and -0.13. Therefore, I am able to explore the
effect of the correlation coefficient on carbon emissions.
Demand side calibration
On the demand side, I calibrate the gross surplus function of electricity consumption. I
take an isoelastic demand function in the form Dj(pj) = Zjpεjj , where pj is the state-
independent equilibrium retail price, p¯j is the value of lost load (VoLL), εj is the long-
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run price elasticity of electricity demand, and Zj is the demand parameter in country j
(j ∈ DE,PL,FR,ES).19
The literature provides a wide range of elasticity estimates (from -0.1 to 1.8), depending
on the country, year, and sectors estimated.20 Therefore, I follow the similar strategy
used in Reguant (2019) to calibrate the long-run elasticity term. I take a benchmark
elasticity for the household and non-household sector, and form a country-level elasticity
by taking the weighted average of the elasticity. The sector weights, which are defined by
the share of final electricity consumption by each sector, are obtained from the European
Environmental Agency (EEA) (Table 1).
Table 1: Demand elasticities and shares by customer class
Sector Elasticity Share
FR ES PL DE
Household -0.5 36% 30% 22% 25%
Non-household -1 64% 70% 78% 75%
The demand parameter Zj is calibrated using the 2016 retail price and consumption data
obtained from EuroStat and ENTSO-E respectively, using the following formula:
Zj = qj0 ∗ p−εjj0 (7)
where qj0 is the average hourly consumption for country j and pj0 is the sector weighted
retail price of electricity (including all taxes and levies, shown in Table 2). The sector
weights are the same as in Table 1.
Table 2: Sector specific electricity retail prices
Sector Unit Annual average retail price
FR ES PL DE
Household €/MWh 169.8 223.5 134.2 297.3Non-household 111 129.1 99.8 196.6
The VoLL for each country is taken from a report from the Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators (ACER) report (ACER 2018). Table 3 exhibits the calibrated values.
Supply side calibration
19 The VoLL can be interpreted as the maximum price that consumers are willing to pay to be supplied
with energy. This can be regarded as an upper bound for the retail price. The reason to impose an
upper bound for is to have a non-infinite consumer surplus.
20 For example Auray et al. (2018) estimate the long-run elasticity for the residential sector in France
ranging from -1.4 to -1.8. Chang et al. (2019) estimate the elasticity for the industrial sector for OECD
countries ranging from -0.1 to -0.5. Burke and Abayasekara (2018) estimate the long-run residential and
industrial elasticity to be -1.16 and -1.34 respectively in the United States.
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Table 3: Demand side calibrated parameter values for each country
Variable Definition Source Unit FR ES PL DE
εj Demand elasticity Literature -0.82 -0.85 -0.89 -0.88
p¯j Value of lost load ACER report € 6920 7880 6260 12410
pj0 Sector weighted retail price EuroStat €/MWh 132.2 157.4 107.3 221.5
qj0 Annual average consumption ENTSO-E MWh 54392 28508 18714 54768
On the supply side, I aggregate the electricity generation profile of each country into
three types: nuclear, thermal, and renewables. Nuclear is considered as the baseload
technology (subscripted b) in France, Spain, and Germany, which is assumed to run at
all states due to its inflexibility. Thermal power, including gas, coal, and oil (subscripted
f), has state dependent output. Of the renewables (subscripted i), I consider both wind
and solar power, generating output at full capacity in the renewable state.
Baseload and thermal technology For each fuel type (denoted by m,m ∈ {coal, gas, oil})
in the thermal power, the country specific marginal capacity costs (rjfm) and fuel and
operation costs (cjfm) are obtained from the IEA (2015) report.21 I then compute the
capacity and production weight for each fuel type using data from ENTSO-E. Thus, the
thermal power marginal costs for each country (cjf , rjf ) are the weighted average of the
marginal costs of each fuel type:
cjf =
∑
m
qjfm
Qjf
∗ cjfm (8)
rjf =
∑
m
kjfm
Kjf
∗ rjfm (9)
qjfm is the annual output of technology m in country j, Qjf is the total annual output
of thermal power, kjfm is the installed capacity of technology m in country j, and Kjf is
the total capacity of thermal power.
For nuclear power, the marginal fuel costs (cjb) and marginal capacity costs (rjb) are
taken directly from the IEA (2015) report. The capacity for the baseload technology
(Kjb) is capped at the current level, obtained from ENTSO-E. This assumption allows
for the fade-out and not the expansion of nuclear.
Intermittent renewables I calibrate the marginal capacity cost function of wind and
solar using data from the Global Wind Atlas and Solargis respectively (see Appendix A.7
for detailed methodology). The convex cost functions capture the heterogeneity in actual
power yield. The capacity factors νj and correlation coefficient ρ are calculated using the
21 The IEA (2015) report project costs for the near future (5 years). So here I assume that the
projected cost in 2015 is applicable in 2016.
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actual generation data from ENTSO-E.22 The upper bound for wind capacity (K¯j,wind) is
taken from a European Commission report (Dalla Longa et al. 2018). The upper bound
for solar capacity in Spain is approximated using the following formula (see Appendix
A.7 for land area calculation):
K¯j,solar =
Land area avaliable for solar panels (km2)
per MW solar panel surface area (km2/MW) (10)
Emissions factor The electricity producers’ cost of emissions for each unit of electricity
produced depends on the carbon emission intensity of the fuel source. According to a re-
port from the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), generating 1 kWh
from coal can emit 670-870 gCO2eq, while gas power plants emit 350-490 gCO2eq/kWh
(Schlömer et al. 2014). The country-level emission factors vary as a function of the com-
position of production in each country. I construct country-level emission factors (ej)
for the thermal technology and use them to calculate the actual carbon price per MWh
of electricity output. I assume that the technology for each fuel type is identical across
countries. I take the median life-cycle emissions factor reported in Schlömer et al. (2014)
for each fuel type.
Local electricity tax France, Spain, Germany, and Poland also have local electricity
taxes on top of the marginal costs of electricity generation. The tax levels are obtained
from the EuroStat retail prices data and denoted as τj. In the simulations, I assume
that the local taxes are maintained at the current levels and are imposed on electricity
generated from non-renewable sources.
Table 4 summarizes the calibrated parameter values used in the model simulation.
22 The capacity factor νj = actual annual generation MWhinstalled capacity MW * total hours of the year h .
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Table 4: Supply side calibrated parameter values for each country
Variable Definition Source Unit FR ES PL DE
cb Baseload fuel cost IEA report €/MWh 7.00 7.00 - 7.00
rb Baseload capacity cost IEA report €/MWh 20.18 20.18 - 20.18
Kb Baseload capacity ENTSO-E MW 63130 7572 - 10793
cf Thermal fuel cost IEA report €/MWh 46.41 40.67 18.13 17.39
rf Thermal capacity cost IEA report €/MWh 8.03 5.63 7.50 6.72
ej Emission factor IPCC Annex III tCO2/MWh 0.55 0.64 0.81 0.80
τj Sector weighted local electricity tax EuroStat €/MWh 48.9 33.6 24.7 127.7
K¯j,wind Maximum wind capacity JRC report MW 731000 944000 - 308000
αj1,wind
a Parameters for wind cost
Global Wind Atlas
3.36 ∗ 10−3 4.51 ∗ 10−12 - 5.99 ∗ 10−9
αj2,wind Parameters for wind cost 10.78 30.06 - 22.4439
αj3,wind Parameters for wind cost 27.44 56.10 - 30.5000
αj4,wind Parameters for wind cost 9.96 10.75 - 20.0850
νj,wind Average wind capacity factor ENTSO-E 0.19 0.23 - 0.18
ρwind Wind-wind correlation ENTSO-E 0.37931 - -
K¯j,solar Maximum solar capacity GeoNetwork MW - 1009003 - -
αj1,solar
a Parameters for solar cost
Solargis
- 7.63 ∗ 10−6 - -
αj2,solar Parameters for solar cost - 13.95 - -
αj3,solar Parameters for solar cost - 2.68 - -
αj4,solar Parameters for solar cost - 15.15 - -
νj,solar Average solar capacity factor ENTSO-E - 0.20 - -
ρsolar Wind-solar correlation ENTSO-E -0.1358 - -
a Fitted renewable capacity cost function: α1eα2x + α3x+ α4.
x in the function is the percentage of total available wind or solar capacity used. x ∈ [0, 1].
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5.2 Simulation results
I present simulations for the Germany-Poland (DE-PL) and France-Spain (FR-ES) inter-
connections. I assume exogenous variations in the transmission capacity and the SCC,
and optimize over capacities, production, consumption, and trade. I also assume that the
interconnection capacities in the rest of the interconnected region remain unchanged.
5.2.1 Germany and Poland
Social welfare and prices
Figure 11 shows the impact of expanding transmission from 0 gigawatt (GW) to 20 GW
on social welfare, under SCC of €25, €55, €85, and €125 per metric ton of CO2. We can
see that the DE-PL interconnection is welfare-enhancing compared to the autarky case.
Moreover, welfare increases at a faster rate for lower levels of SCC.
Figure 11: Simulated percentage change in social welfare with DE-PL interconnection
Figure 12 exhibits how retail prices in Germany (left) and Poland (right) countries change
with respect to the transmission capacity and at different levels of SCC. We can see that
at SCC equals to 25, 55, and 85 €/tCO2 the retail prices in Germany decreases with more
transmission capacity (i.e. consumption increaes). The retail prices in Poland remains
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unchanged. However, at SCC equals to 125 €/tCO2, retail price in Germany increases
with more transmission capacity and decreases in Poland at high transmission capacities.
we can see that the gains are shared unevenly between consumers and producers. This
result is in line with Proposition 1.iii. Increased transmission does not necessarily lead
to lower prices and higher consumption.
Figure 12: Simulated percentage change in retail prices in Germany and Poland
Figure 13 shows the state-dependent wholesale prices in Germany (left) and Poland (right)
countries for SCC equals to 55 and 125 €/tCO2. Clearly, in most cases, the wholesale
price in Poland is lower than that in Germany. Therefore, Germany imports at maxi-
mum transmission capacity from Poland. The only exception is in the wind state with
high SCC. In this case, the wholesale price in Germany is lower than that in Poland,
Poland imports from Germany until the price difference diminishes (solid blue line at
high transmission capacity).
Installed capacities and production
Figure 14 shows the respective capacity share of each fuel type in Poland (upper) and
Germany (lower). It can be observed that the thermal capacity in Poland increases with
more transmission capacity, and the reverse holds true for Germany. Therefore, thermal
capacity shifts to Poland because of the cost advantage. The wind capacity in Germany
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Figure 13: Simulated percentage change in retail prices in Germany and Poland
decreases with more transmission capacity. But under high transmission capacity, a
higher SCC leads to more renewables.
Moreover, the simulation shows that nuclear capacity is constant across all cases. This is
because nuclear power emits little CO2 so the SCC does not affect its marginal production
cost. Therefore, if Germany were to phase-out all of its nuclear power, they need to
substitute with more thermal power capacity (or increase transmission capacity to import
from other countries).
Figure 15 exhibits the share of wind production for given transmission capacities with
increasing SCC. It is clear from the figure that for any transmission capacity, there exists
a threshold level of SCC such that renewable production share decreases if the SCC is
lower than the threshold. This result is consistent with Proposition 1 ii. We can infer that
at the current level of SCC (35 €/tCO2), expanding interconnection between Germany
and Poland may lead to a decreasing renewables as a share of final energy consumption.
Carbon emissions
Figure 16 shows the corresponding carbon emissions for different levels of SCC and trans-
mission capacity. It is straightforward from the figure that at low levels of SCC (SCC
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Figure 14: Simulated fuel type capacity with DE-PL interconnection
<110 €/tCO2), increasing transmission capacity exacerbates total carbon emissions. The
result is driven by the low electricity taxes in Poland. However, at high levels of SCC,
interconnection facilitates the diffusion of renewables and reduces overall carbon emis-
sions.
5.2.2 France and Spain
In the FR-ES case, the gains from interconnection vary depending on the correlation of
renewables. I simulate two separate cases, FR wind-ES wind and FR wind-ES solar, to
explore the effect of intermittency correlation. The simulation for FR-ES can shed light
on how interconnection can facilitate the diffusion of renewable power with correlated
production.
Renewable curtailment
The renewable curtailment rate is measured by the unused renewable production over
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Figure 15: Simulated wind production with DE-PL interconnection
Figure 16: Simulated total emission with DE-PL interconnection
the total renewable output. The curtailment rate thus depends on two factors: the
probability of both countries producing with renewable power simultaneously and the
excess renewable capacity available for exportation.
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Figure 17 shows how the renewable curtailment rate changes under increasing trans-
mission capacity and for different levels of correlation coefficient. For 17a and 17b the
curtailment rate is shown on the same scale. Thus, it is straightforward that at lower
correlation coefficient (Figure 17b), the curtailment rate is much lower than at higher
correlation coefficient (Figure 17a). Therefore, interconnecting two countries with more
negatively correlated renewable production can make more efficient use of renewable ca-
pacities.
Moreover, the curtailment rate increases with higher SCC and higher transmission ca-
pacity. This is because both the SCC and transmission capacity motives the investment
in renewable capacity. The higher the excess renewable capacity for exportation, the
higher the curtailment rate. Thus, with the increasing share of renewables in the grid,
curtailment can be efficient in some states of nature.
Figure 17: Simulated curtailment FR-ES interconnection
(a) FR Wind-ES Wind (b) FR Wind-ES Solar
Carbon emissions
In the case of FR wind-ES wind interconnection, expanding interconnection at low carbon
prices increases carbon emissions. This result is driven by the scale effect of trade, where
consumption levels increases with trade. However, at high carbon prices, thermal pro-
duction becomes less competitive and more wind capacities are installed. Consequently,
total emissions decrease.
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Comparing 18a and 18b we can conclude that the total emissions in the FR wind-ES solar
case is lower than that in the FR wind-ES wind case. This is consistent with Corollary 1.
Because of the lower curtailment rate with more negatively correlated renewable energy
across countries, over all carbon emission level is also lower.
Figure 18: Simulated carbon emission with FR-ES interconnection
(a) FR Wind-ES Wind (b) FR Wind-ES Solar
5.3 EU 2030
The existing interconnection capacity between DE-PL and FR-ES are 1700 MW and 2800
MW respectively. To achieve the EU 2030 interconnection target, DE-PL and FR-ES need
to achieve 7000 MW and 13500 MW (TYNDP 2016).23
Table 5 exhibits the model simulated capacities, production, consumption, and emission
levels change in response to achieving the EU 2030 interconnection target with respect
to the status quo. The SCC is taken at the projected 2030 level of €45/tCO2 (for a 3%
discount rate).
For the DE-PL case, achieving the EU2030 target increases total consumption level and
the thermal power capacity; and it reduces renewable capacity and the share of renew-
able production. Consequently, carbon emissions increase due to both the scale effect
23 These interconnection targets are the upper bound of the target estimates.
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Table 5: Simulated responses to the EU 2030 target
EU 2030 DE-PL FR wind-ES wind FR wind-ES solar
Transmission capacity 7 GW 13.5 GW 13.5 GW
Thermal capacity 0.21% -0.11% -0.35%
Renewable capacity -9.68% -0.11% 37.65%
Renewable production share -9.85% 3.90% 34.59%
Consumption 0.18% -0.05% -0.18%
Carbon emissions 1.69% 1.74% -7.18%
and the reverse technique effect of trade. This result is driven by the high electricity
taxes in Germany. If the market become more integrated through expanded intercon-
nection, Poland can bid at a much lower price for electricity production. Therefore, in
equilibrium, Germany invest in less renewable capacity and shift thermal power produc-
tion to Poland. This leads to lowered consumer prices and thus increased consumption
and carbon emissions.
For the FR-ES case, the effect of the EU2030 target depend on the type of energy mix
we consider in each country. If both countries have only wind energy, expanding inter-
connection decreases total consumption level, thermal and renewable capacities; and it
increases carbon emissions. However, if France installs wind turbines and Spain installs
solar panels, the negative correlation of the two energy sources leads to an overall increase
in renewable capacity and thus lowered carbon emissions. Therefore, the effect of the
EU2030 target in reality should be bounded by the FR wind-ES wind and FR wind-ES
solar case.
The EU wide 2030 climate targets are set to decrease carbon emissions in the power
sector by 43% (compared to the 2005 level) and increase the share of renewables in
final energy consumption to 31%. The carbon emission goal can be translated into a
decrease of 31% from the 2016 level.24 Therefore, achieving the interconnection target
can potentially contribute to -5 ∼ 23% of this goal. In addition, the 2030 EU climate and
energy framework has set a binding renewable energy target to account for at least 32%
of final energy consumption. Even in the FR wind-ES solar case, which has the highest
renewable production share of 14%, we are still far from meeting the target.
24 The total EU green house gas (GHG) emissions in 2005 was 5351 MtCO2e and in 2016 was 4441
MtCO2e. Thus, the equivalent of 43% decreases compared to the 2005 level is 31% decrease compared
to the 2016 level.
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5.4 Benefit-cost analysis of electricity interconnection
In this part, I conduct a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) to look at whether the social welfare
benefits can outweigh the high upfront investment cost of the transmission lines. I choose
the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) as the evaluation criterion in this case. If BCR> 1, then
a project generates more benefit than cost. The BCR is calculated according to the
following formula:
BCR(Kx) =
∑T
t=0
Bt(Kx)
(1+r)t
C(Kx)
(11)
where Bt is the social welfare benefit generate in period t, C is the investment cost, Kx
is the transmission capacity, T is the lifetime of the project, and r is the discount rate.
The cost of transmission varies significantly according to capacity, distance of transmis-
sion lines and the type of terrain (undersea, through mountains or overhead). For the
DE-PL interconnectors, I take the median reported investment cost for 380/400 kV 2
circuit overhead alternating current (AC) transmission lines from ACER (2015). For the
FR-ES interconnectors, I take a capacity weighted average cost of the existing or planned
transmission lines.25
The investment cost for a given level of transmission capacity is calculated according to
C(Kx) =
Kx ∗ c¯ij ∗Dij
1− l¯ij
(12)
where Dij is the length of the transmission lines between two nodes i and j (i, j ∈
{FR,ES,DE, PL}), c¯ij is the average per kilometer Megawatt cost, and l¯ij the average
loss of electricity on the transmission lines. Table 6 presents the values taken for the
BCA.
25 Between France and Spain, there is an existing interconnection of 1400 MW that extends 65 km
through the Pyrenees. The investment cost for this project was around 700 M€. Another recently
permitted interconnection project is the Biscay Gulf Project, which will build a 2200 interconnection
that extends for 370 km undersea. The estimated investment cost for this project is 1750 M€.
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Table 6: Cost parameters of HVDC transmission lines
Interconnection Unit DE-PL FR-ES
Average cost (c¯ij) €/MW-km 1023 4305a
Average line loss (l¯ij) /GW 0.88% 0.72%
Average distance (Dij) km 170 251
Lifetime (T ) years 25 25
Interest rate (r) 4% 4%
a The large difference between the cost of DE-PL and
FR-ES is mainly due to the terrine type.
The benefit for each period is the gain in social welfare with the transmission capacity.
Bt(Kx) = Wt(Kx, δt)−Wt(0, δt) (13)
I take values suggested by the ENTSO-E’s BCA guidelines for the lifetime and discount
rate for evaluating grid development projects (ENTSO-E 2015). I assume over the 25-year
period of the project, that the carbon price in each country equals the SCC, and that
the SCC increases by €5 every five years. This is in line with the SCC projected by the
EPA at a 3% discount rate (Executive Order No. 12,866 2016). Assuming the lines can
be commissioned in 2025. At 2025, the SCC is €40, and by the end of the 25 years, the
SCC is €60. The benefit of period t thus depends on the SCC and transmission capacity.
The results of the BCA for achieving the EU2030 interconnection target are shown in
Table 7.
Table 7: Benefit-cost analysis of electricity interconnection
DE-PL
5300 MW DE share PL share
Benefit (B€) 57.78 100% 0%
Cost(B€) 0.966
Benefit-cost ratio 59.77
FR wind - ES wind FR wind - ES solar
10700 MW FR share ES share 10700 MW FR share ES share
Benefit (B€) 21.83 97.31% 2.72% 34.28 78.82% 21.24%
Cost(B€) 12.53 12.53
Benefit-cost ratio 1.74 2.74
The results confirm that expanding the DE-PL and FR-ES interconnection generates
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positive net benefits, despite the high investment cost. However, the benefit-cost ratios
should be interpreted with care since I only considered the first-order cost of investment,
abstracting from subsequent operation and maintenance costs. Note that in the DE-PL
case, the benefit-cost ratio of the transmission project is large. The benefit consists of
the increased consumer surplus in Germany and the avoided investment cost in wind
capacity. Whereas in the FR-ES case, the benefit-cost ratio is much smaller.
Table 7 also displays the share of the welfare benefit acquired in each country. It is
straightforward that the benefits are unevenly shared between countries. Germany ben-
efits more than Poland; France benefits more than Spain. In all three cases, the net-
importers of electricity extract a higher share of the benefit. Knowing the shares of
benefits can assist decision-making regarding the investment cost payment of the two
countries for cross-border transmission projects.
6 Concluding remarks
The decarbonization of the power sector requires electricity generation to find alternatives
to thermal power. However, the substitutability of renewables diminishes with intermit-
tency. Electricity interconnection can potentially smooth the spatial intermittency of
renewable production and make more efficient use of available generation technologies.
This paper provides an optimal investment and production model that focuses on electric-
ity interconnection and studies whether interconnection with intermittent renewables al-
ways facilitates the penetration of renewable energies and reduces carbon emissions. The
theoretical model shows that interconnection does not always lead to more renewables or
lower emissions. When countries coordinate to maximize social welfare, subject to an ex-
ogenous SCC and transmission capacities, interconnection may decrease the social value
for renewable investment and exacerbate carbon emissions if the SCC is low. Conversely,
interconnection may expand renewable investments and decrease carbon emissions if the
SCC is high. The results are driven by the competitiveness between renewables and ther-
mal power. Since electricity is a homogeneous good, interconnection benefits whichever
is the more efficient technology. At low carbon prices, thermal power is more competitive
than renewables; therefore, renewable capacity decreases.
To simulate the impact of interconnection, I calibrate the model using data from four
representative EU countries: Germany, Poland, France, and Spain. The simulations show
that in a representative EU context, achieving the EU 2030 interconnection targets may
increase carbon emissions for some countries. This is because currently, countries adopt
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different energy taxation schemes on top of the regional level emissions trading scheme.
If the electricity market becomes more integrated, countries like Germany who adopts
very high domestic electricity taxes can by cheaper electricity from the market. Conse-
quently, Germany may increase its electricity consumption level and reduce investments
in renewable capacity, which lead to more carbon emissions. This result implies that
although interconnection is strictly welfare improving for the EU, carbon emissions do
not necessarily decrease, unless the SCC is high.
From the welfare perspective, the benefit-cost analysis suggests a positive net-benefit from
interconnection. But the interconnected countries share the net-benefit to varied extents.
Currently in the EU, interconnection investments are shared between the interconnected
countries and the European Commission.26 The different benefit-cost ratios of projects
and the unbalanced share of net benefit can shed lights on where the investment should
be targeted and how the cost should be split between countries.
The optimal capacities, production, and consumption characterized in the model can be
decentralized as a competitive market equilibrium if there is a global Pigouvian carbon
tax equal to the SCC. Although a direct carbon tax is most efficient, the public has been
reluctant to accept a direct tax. Therefore, most countries and regions including the
EU and China are implementing revenue neutral policies, such as the emissions trading
scheme. This model framework can also be adapted to consider other carbon policy
instruments, such as cap-and-trade, renewable portfolio standard, and feed-in-tariffs for
renewables.
In many cases, the interconnected countries and regions may adopt different carbon poli-
cies. For example, California implements stringent cap-and-trade programs, whereas its
neighboring states in the southwestern and northwestern U.S. adopt few carbon policies.
Since California is the largest electricity importer of all of the U.S. states, the externality
from the uncontrolled emissions of other states may decrease the social welfare of Califor-
nia.27 Future research is needed to investigate how interconnection with heterogeneous
carbon policies affect total emissions.
26For example, the Biscay Gulf project between France and Spain receives €578 million from the EU,
for an estimated cost of €1.7 billion.
27 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, California imports on average 90 million
MWh per year. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38912
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Replacing Kcf with Qc in problem 2, we have
max
Qc, q
h
cf , Ki
S(Qc)− (κc + δ)(νqhcf − (1− ν)Qc)− rfQc − f(Ki)
s.t. Ki + q
h
cf = Qc [λ]
Qc ≥ qhcf [µ¯]
qhcf ≥ 0 [µ]
Ki ≥ 0 [γ]
(A.1)
We can write the following Lagrangian:
L =S(Qc)− ν
(
(κc + δ)q
h
cf − λ(Qc − qhcf −Ki)− µqhcf − µ¯(Qc − qhcf )− γKi
)
− (1− ν)(κ+δ)Qc − f(Ki)− rfQc
(A.2)
The first order conditions (focs) are:
∂L
∂Qc
= S ′(Qc) + λν − (1− ν)(κc + δ)− rf = 0 (A.3)
∂L
∂qhcf
= µ− µ¯− λ− κc − δ = 0 (A.4)
∂L
∂Ki
= ν(γ − λ)− f ′(Ki) = 0 (A.5)
plus the complementary slackness conditions.
Substitute λ in equation A.5 by equation A.4: f ′(Ki)
ν
= κc+δ+µ¯−µ+γ. If f ′(Ki)ν > κc+δ,
thus µ¯ > 0, µ = 0, γ > 0, qhcf = Qc, Ki = 0, and Qc = D(κc + δ + rf ).
If f ′(Ki)
ν
= κc + δ, µ¯ = 0, µ = 0, γ = 0, λ = κc + δ, 0 < qhcf < Qc, Ki > 0, and
Qc = D(κc + δ + rf ).
If f ′(Ki)
ν
< κc+ δ, µ¯ = 0, µ > 0, γ = 0, λ = f
′(Ki)
ν
, qhcf = 0, and Ki = Qc = D((1− ν)(κc+
δ) + f ′(Ki) + rf ).
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Several simplifications can be made for problem 3. qhjf ∀j can be replaced by the non-state-
contingent demands. Kcf and Kdf can be replaced by Qc − xl and Qd + xl respectively.
Since Kt is not binding, the trade quantity is capped by the consumption in Clean and
Dirty.
The simplified problem is as follows:
max
Qj ,x
s,Ki
j=C,D,s=h,l
S(Qc) + S(Qd)− ν
(
κc(Qc + x
h −Ki) + κd(Qd − xh) + δ(Qc +Qd −Ki
)
− (1− ν)(κc(Qc − xl) + κd(Qd + xl) + δ(Qc +Qd))− rf (Qc +Qd)− f(Ki)
s.t. Ki ≤ Qc + xh [λ]
xh + xl ≤ Ki [λ¯]
xh ≤ Qd [µ¯]
xh ≥ −Qc [µ]
xl ≤ Qc [ξ]
Ki ≥ 0 [η]
(A.6)
The Lagrangian is:
L =S(Qc) + S(Qd)− ν
(
κc(Qc + x
h −Ki) + κd(Qd − xh) + δ(Qc +Qd −Ki)
− λ¯(Ki − xh − xl)− λ(Qc + xh −Ki)− µ¯(Qd − xh)− µ(xh +Qc)− ηKi
)
− (1− ν)(κc(Qc − xl) + κd(Qd + xl) + δ(Qc +Qd)− ξ(Qc − xl))
− rf (Qc +Qd)− f(Ki)
(A.7)
Taking the (focs):
∂L
∂Qc
= S ′(Qc)− κc − δ − rf + ν(λ+ µ) + (1− ν)ξ = 0 (A.8)
∂L
∂Qd
= S ′(Qd)− κd − δ − rf + νµ¯ = 0 (A.9)
∂L
∂xh
= −ν(κc − κd + λ¯− λ+ µ¯− µ) = 0 (A.10)
∂L
∂xl
= (1− ν)(κc − κd − ξ)− νλ¯ = 0 (A.11)
∂L
∂Ki
= ν(κc + δ + λ¯− λ+ η)− f ′(Ki) = 0 (A.12)
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plus the complementary slackness conditions.
Rearrange equation A.11 we get
κc − κd = ν
1− ν λ¯+ ξ (A.13)
Given the assumption κc > κd, it must be λ¯ > 0, ξ > 0. Therefore xl = Qc and
Ki = x
h + xl.
Equation A.12 and A.10 give us
f ′(Ki)
ν
− (κd + δ) = µ− µ¯+ η (A.14)
Ki and the direction of trade flow in the state h depend on comparison between the long-
run marginal cost of renewable capacity and the marginal cost of thermal production. If
f ′(Ki)
ν
> κd + δ, then µ > 0, µ¯ = 0, η > 0. If f
′(Ki)
ν
= κd + δ, then µ = 0, µ¯ = 0, η = 0. If
f ′(Ki)
ν
< κd + δ, then µ = 0, µ¯ > 0, η = 0. The optimal quantities thus follow.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1.i follows directly from Lemma 1 and 2 by looking at KAjf and KFjf ∀j ∈
{c, d}. For any value of the SCC, KAcf = QAc and KAdf = QAd , KFcf = 0 and KFdf = QFc +QFd .
Proposition 1.ii is proved by comparing KAi to KFi . Denote ∆Ki = KAi −KFi .
∆Ki =

0 if δ ≤ δA
f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)) > 0 if δA < δ ≤ δF
f ′−1(ν(κc + δ))− f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)) > 0 if δF < δ ≤ δ¯A
D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf )− f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)) if δ¯A < δ ≤ δ¯F
D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf )−
2D((1− ν)(κd + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki)F ) < 0 if δ > δ¯F
Since ∆Ki < 0 if δ ≤ δ¯A, ∆Ki > 0 if δ > δ¯F , and ∆Ki|δ¯A<δ≤δ¯F is monotonically increasing
in δ, it is straightforward that ∃ δˆ ∈ (δ¯A, δ¯F ), such that ∆Ki = 0 if δ = δˆ.
Proposition 1.iii is proved by comparing QAj to QFj ∀j ∈ {c, d}. For the Dirty country,
QFd > Q
A
d when δ > δ¯F , and QFd = QAd when δ ≤ δ¯F . For the Clean country, QFc > QAc
∀δ ≤ δˆ. If δ > δˆ, depending on the convexity of the cost function f(), QAc ⋛ QFc as shown
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below.
QAc −QFc =

D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf )−
D(κd + δ + rf ) if δˆ < δ ≤ δ¯F
D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf )−
D((1− ν)(κd + δ) + rf + f ′(KFi )) if δ > δ¯F
QAc −QFc has the reverse sign as the difference between the retail prices pAc − pFc .
pAc − pFc =

(1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf−
(κd + δ + rf ) if δˆ < δ ≤ δ¯F
(1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf−
(1− ν)(κd + δ)− rf − f ′(Ki)F if δ > δ¯F
pAc − pFc
> 0 if δˆ < δ <
(1−ν)κc+f ′(Ki)A−κd
ν
< 0 if (1−ν)κc+f ′(Ki)A−κd
ν
< δ < f
′(Ki)F−f ′(Ki)A
1−ν − (κc − κd)
There may ∃ δ˚ such that the relationship between the autarky and free trade consumption
level in the Clean country is reversed.
Proposition 1.iv is proved by comparing EA = ∑j,s qsAjf to EF = ∑j,s qsFjf . Denote
∆E = EF − EA.
∆E =

D(κd + δ + rf )−D(κc + δ + rf ) > 0 if δ ≤ δA
D(κd + δ + rf )−D(κc + δ + rf ) + νf ′−1(κc + δ) > 0 if δA < δ ≤ δF
D(κd + δ + rf )−D(κc + δ + rf )−
ν(f ′−1(κd + δ)− f ′−1(κc + δ)) > 0 if δF < δ ≤ δ¯A
D(κd + δ + rf )− νf ′−1(κd + δ)−
(1− ν)D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf ) > 0 if δ¯A < δ ≤ δˆ
D(κd + δ + rf )− νf ′−1(κd + δ)−
(1− ν)D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf ) if δˆ < δ ≤ δ¯F
2(1− ν)D((1− ν)(κd + δ) + rf + f ′(KFi ))−
(1− ν)D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + f ′(Ki)A + rf )−
D(κd + δ + rf ) < 0 if δ ≥ δ¯F
Since ∆E > 0 if δ ≤ δˆ, ∆E < 0 if δ > δ¯F , and ∆E|δˆ<δ≤δ¯F is monotonically decreasing in
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δ, then ∃ δ˜ ∈ (δˆ, δ¯F ), such that ∆E = 0 if δ = δ˜.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Rewrite the maximization problem by replacing the non-contingent demand constraints
and Kf with Qc:
max
Qc,qsf ,Ki,x
s∈{a,b,c}
2
(
S(Qc)− σhh(κc + δ)qaf − σhl(κc + δ)(2Qc −Ki)
− σll(κc + δ)Qc − rfQc − f(Ki)
)
s.t. qaf +Ki ≥ Qc [λ]
Qc ≥ 2Qc −Ki ≥ 0 [φ¯, φ]
0 ≤ qaf ≤ Qc [µ, µ¯]
Ki ≥ 0 [η]
x = max{Ki −Qc, 0} [ξ]
0 ≤ x ≤ min{Kt, Qc} [γ, γ¯]
(A.15)
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem:
L =2
(
S(Qc)− σhh(κc + δ)qaf − σhl(κc + δ)(2Qc −Ki)− σll(κc + δ)Qc − rfQc
− f(Ki) + σhh(λ(qaf +Ki −Qc) + µqaf + µ¯(Qc − qaf ))
+ σhl(γx+ γ¯(min{Kt, Qc} − x) + φ¯(Ki −Qc) + φ(2Qc −Ki)) + νηKi
+ σhlξ(x−max{Ki −Qc, 0})
) (A.16)
The focs are:
∂L
∂Qc
= S ′(Qc)− (2σhl + σll)(κc + δ)− rf − σhhλ+ σhhµ¯
+ σhl(γ¯1Kt>Qc + φ+ ξ) = 0
(A.17)
∂L
∂qaf
= − σhh(κc + δ − λ− µ+ µ¯) = 0 (A.18)
∂L
∂Ki
= σhl(κc + δ − φ+ φ¯− ξ1Ki>Qc)− f ′(Ki) + σhhλ+ νη = 0 (A.19)
∂L
∂x
= σhl(γ − γ¯ + ξ) = 0 (A.20)
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plus the complementary slackness conditions.
From equations A.18, A.19, we can obtain
f ′(Ki)− ν(κc + δ) = νη + σhh(µ¯− µ) + σhl(φ¯− φ− ξ1Ki>Qc)
When Kt > 0,
1. If f ′(Ki) > ν(κc + δ), η > 0, µ¯ > 0, µ = 0, φ¯ > 0, φ = 0.
Thus KTi = 0, qaTf = QTc = KTf , xT = 0, and QTc = D(κc + δ + rf ). The threshold
δ =
ri
ν
− c.
2. If f ′(Ki) = ν(κc + δ), η = 0, µ¯ = 0, µ = 0, φ¯ = 0, φ = 0.
There are two sub-cases:
(a) KTi ≤ QTc
qaTf = Q
T
c − KTi , KTi = f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)), xT = 0, and QT = D(κc + δ + rf ).
The threshold δ for KTi = QTc is denoted δˆ and solves for f ′−1(ν(κc + δˆ)) =
D(κc + δˆ + rf ).
(b) KTi > QTc
qaTf = 0, xT = KTi −QT , KTi = f ′−1(ν(κc+ δ)) and QT = D(κc+ δ+ rf ). The
threshold δ for KTi = QTc +Kt is denoted δ¯T and solves for f ′−1(ν(c+ δ¯T )) =
D(c+ δ¯T + rf ) +Kt and ∂δ¯T∂Kt ≥ 0.
3. If f ′(Ki) < ν(κc + δ), η = 0, µ¯ = 0, µ > 0, φ¯ = 0, φ > 0, ξ > 0.
In this case, qaTf = 0, xT = max{Kt, QTc }, KTi = QTc +xT , and QTc = D((1−ν)(κc+
δ) + rf + f
′(KTi )). This cases occurs when δ > δ¯T .
If Kt > QT , KTi = 2QTc and QTc = D(σll(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(KTi )).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
By comparing Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, it is straightforward that when δ ≤ δ¯A, the
optimal capacities and consumption have the exact same expressions. Therefore, trade
is equivalent as autarky.
When δ > δ¯A, when f ′(KTi ) = κc + δ, there is now more renewable capacity than local
demand: QTc = D(κc + δ + rf ) < KTi . ∀ δ > δ¯A, QTc < QAc = D((1 − ν)(κc + δ) + rf +
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f ′(KAi )). Therefore, renewable capacities increases with trade and consumption decreases
with trade.
For carbon emissions, EA = 2(1 − ν)QAc , and ET = 2(1 − ν)QTc − 2σhlKi < EA. Thus,
carbon emissions also decreases with trade.
To check how QTc , KTi change with relaxed Kt and ρ, we need the following system of
equations if Kt < QT :S ′(QTc ) = (1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki)Ki = QTc +Kt
They can be rewritten as implicit functions F (QTc , Ki;Kt) = 0. Rewrite in matrix form:[
S ′′(QTc ) −f ′′(KTi )
−1 1
][
∂Qc
∂Kt
∂Ki
∂Kt
]
= −
[
0
−1
]
The determinant of the Jacobians
|J | =S ′′(QTc )− f ′′(KTi ) < 0 (A.21)
|JQcKt | =f ′′(KTi ) < 0 (A.22)
|JKiKt | =− S ′′(QT ) > 0 (A.23)
By applying Cremer’s rule,
∂QTc
∂Kt
= −|JQcKt ||J | < 0
∂KTi
∂Kt
= −|JKiKt ||J | > 0
Therefore, QTc decreases and KTi increases with more transmission capacity.
If Kt > QT , QTc and KTi solveS ′(QTc ) = σll(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(KTi )KTi = 2QTc
They can be written as implicit functions of ρ: F (QTc , KTi ; ρ) = 0. Rewrite in matrix
form: [
S ′′(QT ) −f ′′(KTi )
−2 1
][
∂Qc
∂ρ
∂Ki
∂ρ
]
= −
[
−ν(1− ν)(κc + δ)
0
]
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|J | =S ′′(QTc )− 2f ′′(KTi ) < 0 (A.24)
|JQcρ| =− ν(1− ν)(κc + δ)− 2f ′′(KTi ) < 0 (A.25)
|JKiρ| =− 2ν(1− ν)(κc + δ) < 0 (A.26)
By applying Cremer’s Rule, we know that QTc and KTi decrease as ρ increases.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
The carbon emissions in the four cases in Lemma 3 are:
i E = 2QTc = 2D(κc + δ + rf )
ii E = 2QTc − νKTi ) = 2(D(κc + δ + rf )− νf ′−1(κc + δ)
iii E = 2(1− ν)QTc − σhl(KTi −QTc ) = 2((1− σhh)D(κc + δ + rf )− σhlf ′−1(κc + δ
iv (a) Kt < QTc : E = 2((1− ν)QTc − σhlKt)
(b) Kt ≥ QTc : E = 2σllQTc
The correlation coefficient affects carbon emissions in cases iii and iv. For iii, dE
dρ
=
2ν(1− ν)(f ′−1(κc + δ)−D(κc + δ + rf )) > 0. For iv(a), dEdρ = ν(1− ν)f ′−1(κc + δ) > 0.
For iv(b), dE
dρ
= 2σll
∂QTc
∂ρ
+ 2ν(1 − ν)QTc = −2σll |
JQρ|
|J | + 2ν(1 − ν)QTc > 0. In all three
cases, emissions increase as ρ increases.
A.7 Fitting the marginal cost curve of renewables
The convexity in marginal cost of renewable capacity can be attributed to several factors,
including the location of wind farms, land cost, installation and labor cost, etc. In
this simulation, I focus on the first-order factor of geographical locations. As renewable
resources are not uniformly distributed across space, the wind turbines and solar panels at
different locations will generate various levels of output, i.e. capacity factors. Therefore,
there is an inverse relationship between the renewable power and the levelized cost of
renewables generated electricity.
Wind power To exploit this inverse relationship for wind power, I use the wind power
density data from the Global Wind Atlas. Figure A.1 shows the incremental mean wind
power density in each percentile. I then use the following formula to obtain the marginal
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Figure A.1: Incremental Mean Wind Power Density
cost values for each percentile of wind areas.
Marginal percentile capcity cost =
Unit investment cost * Country average capacity factor * Max global wind density
Percentile wind power density
(A.27)
The wind power density is the values obtained in Figure A.1; the unit investment cost for
each country is taken from the IEA (2015) report; the country average capacity factor is
calculated using actual generation data from ENTSO-E; and the Max global wind density
is taken from the maximum wind density in the Global Wind Atlas data. The marginal
cost values are then scatter plotted in Figure A.2. To obtain the marginal cost curve, I
fit a function to the data points. ri = α1eα2x + α3x + α4 fits well with the data, where
x is the percentile of wind capacity installed. The lines in Figure A.2 shows the fitted
marginal cost curves. The corresponding functions are thus used in the simulation.
Solar Power Similarly, I fit the solar power marginal cost curve for Spain using solar
power output data obtained from Solargis, and land use data obtained from GeoNetwork.
I assume that solar PV panel can be only put on the land areas in Spain which are
classified as artificial and bare soil. I then map out the solar PV output intensity in these
locations (Figure A.3).
I use the following equation to obtain the marginal capacity cost for each percentile of
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Figure A.2: Fitted wind capacity marginal cost curve
potential solar capacity.
Marginal percentile capcity cost =
Unit investment cost * Country average capacity factor
Percentile PV output/24
(A.28)
The unit investment cost is taken from the IEA (2015) report; the country average ca-
pacity factor is calculated using actual generation data from ENTSO-E, the percentile
PV output is calculated with data from Solargis. The fitted marginal cost curve has the
same functional form as the wind case, with different parameter values (Figure A.4).28
28Python and R code are available upon request.
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Figure A.3: Solar PV output in Spain for suitable locations
Figure A.4: Fitted solar capacity marginal cost curve
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A.8 Extension: Clean-Dirty constrained interconnection
The simplified problem 3 with constrained transmission (Kt < min{Qc, Qd}) is as fol-
lows:
max
Qj ,x
s,Ki
j=c,d,s=h,l
S(Qc) + S(Qd)− ν
(
κc(Qc + x
h −Ki) + κd(Qd − xh) + δ(Qc +Qd −Ki)
)
− (1− ν)(κc(Qc − xl) + κd(Qd + xl) + δ(Qc +Qd))− rf (Qc +Qd)− f(Ki)
s.t. Ki ≤ Qc + xh [λ]
xh + xl ≤ Ki [λ¯]
xh ≤ Kt [µ¯]
xh ≥ −Kt [µ]
xl ≤ Kt [ξ]
Ki ≥ 0 [η]
(A.29)
The Lagrangian is:
L =S(Qc) + S(Qd)− ν
(
κc(Qc + x
h −Ki) + κd(Qd − xh) + δ(Qc +Qd −Ki)
− λ¯(Ki − xh − xl)− λ(Qc + xh −Ki)− µ¯(Kt − xh)− µ(xh +Kt)− ηKi
)
− (1− ν)(κc(Qc − xl) + κd(Qd + xl) + δ(Qc +Qd)− ξ(Kt − xl))
− rf (Qc +Qd)− f(Ki)
(A.30)
Taking the focs:
∂L
∂Qc
= S ′(Qc)− κc − δ − rf + νλ = 0 (A.31)
∂L
∂Qd
= S ′(Qd)− κd − δ − rf = 0 (A.32)
∂L
∂xh
= −ν(κc − κd + λ¯− λ+ µ¯− µ) = 0 (A.33)
∂L
∂xl
= (1− ν)(κc − κd − ξ)− νλ¯ = 0 (A.34)
∂L
∂Ki
= ν(κc + δ + λ¯− λ+ η)− f ′(Ki) = 0 (A.35)
plus the complementary slackness conditions.
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Rearranging equation A.35 we have
f ′(Ki)
ν
− (κc + δ) = λ¯− λ+ η, (A.36)
and equations A.33 and A.35 give
f ′(Ki)
ν
− (κd + δ) = µ− µ¯+ η, (A.37)
By equation A.34, we have κc− κd = ξ + ν1−ν λ¯. Since κc > κd by assumption, then ξ > 0
and λ¯ > 0, so xl = Kt. From equation A.33, we get that Qd = D(κd + δ + rf ), ∀Kt, δ.
Therefore, we only need to pin down Qc, Ki, and xh. Equation A.36 and A.37 jointly
determine the threshold levels of SCC for renewable capacities and the direction of trade
flow in state h. Consequently, all of the other choice variables can then be pinned down
through the value of the multipliers. Therefore, for each value of Kt, there exists a set
of threshold δ, on which the optimal capacities, consumption levels, and trade quantities
depend.
Solving the focs, I obtain the following results:
1. δ < ri
ν
− κc
In this case, λ¯ > 0, λ = 0, η > 0, µ¯ = 0, µ > 0. Therefore, Ki = 0, xh = −Kt.
There is no investment in the renewables and both countries produce with thermal
power. Depending on the transmission capacity, there are two cases.
(a) 0 < Kt < QAc
When when there is constrained transmission, Qc = QAc , Kdf = QAd + Kt,
Kcf = Q
A
c −Kt. The shadow value of allowing for relaxing the transmission
constraint is λ = λA. The retail price pc and pd is the same as under autarky.
Although transmission does not affect the optimal level of consumption in
both countries, it shifts production to the low-cost country. Thus, the optimal
thermal power capacity increases in the Dirty country and decreases in the
Clean country.
(b) QAc ≤ Kt < QFc
When the transmission capacity constraint exceeds the autarky level of de-
mand in Qc, then λ > 0 and µ > 0. Qc = Kt, Kdf = QAd +Kt, Kcf = 0. The
shadow value of increasing transmission capacity is λ = κc − κd − µ., where
µ = κc + δ + rf − S ′(Kt). The retail price in the Clean country decrease to
pC = S
′(Kt).
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In this case, the Clean country can import more electricity than the autarky
demanded at a lower price. All the thermal power production will take place
in the Dirty country.
2. ri
ν
− κc ≤ δ < riν − κd
In this case, λ¯ = 0, λ ≥ 0, η ≥ 0, µ¯ = 0, µ > 0, ξ > 0. So Ki ≤ 0, xh = −Kt.
(a) If 0 < Kt < QAc −KAi , the Clean country will import up to the transmission
capacity in state h and produce the residual demand with both renewables
and thermal power. So qhcf = QAc − KAi − Kt. And in state l, C will import
up to the transmission capacity. Thus Kcf = QAc − Kt, Kdf = Qd + Kt.
QA
c
= D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(KAi )), KAi = f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)).
The shadow value of expanding transmission in both states are µ = ξ = κc−κd.
(b) If QA
c
− KAi ≤ Kt < Q¯Ac , the Clean country will import up to transmission
capacity in state l and produce the residual demand with only renewables.
So Q¯Ac = D((1 − v)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki)) > QAc , Ki = Q¯Ac − Kt, qhcf = 0,
Kcf = Q¯
A
c −Kt, Kdf = Qd +Kt.
The shadow value of allowing for transmission in state h is µ = f ′(KAi )
ν
−(κd+δ),
and in state l is ξ = κc − κd.
(c) If Q¯Ac ≤ Kt < QTc , C will import full transmission capacity in both states.
Qc = Kt, Ki = 0, Kcf = 0, Kdf = Qd +Kt, and pc = κd + δ + rf + µ, where
µ = ξ = S ′(Kt)− (κd+ δ+ rf ) is the shadow value for increasing transmission
capacity.
Thus, given this range of δ, country C decreases its investment in renewables with
gradual opening to trade and increases its level of consumption.
3. ri
ν
− κd ≤ δ < δˆ(Kt)
In this case, the Clean country will have some renewable in state w regardless of the
level of Kt. λ¯ = 0, λ > 0, η′ = 0, µ¯ = 0, µ ≥ 0, ξ > 0. So Ki > 0, xh ≥ −Kt. The
threshold value of δˆ(Kt) is such that renewable production covers the full demand
of C in state h, δˆ(Kt)|xh=0 = f
′(Ki)
ν
− κd, where Ki = Qc. In this case, country
C does not have excess supply of renewables in state h that is cheaper than the
thermal power in the Dirty country.
(a) If 0 < Kt < QAc , there exist a threshold Kˆt(δ) such that if Kt < Kˆt(δ)
xh = −Kt, otherwise, xh > −Kt, i.e. in state w, the transmission constraint
is not binding. Kˆt(δ) is the solution to Kt = Qc − f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)).
• If Kt < Kˆt(δ), then xh = −Kt, f ′(Ki)ν = κc + δ, µ = ξ = κc − κd.
Qc = D(κc+ δ+ rf ), qhcf = Qc−Kt−Ki. Kcf = Qc−Kt, Kdf = Qd+Kt.
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• If Kt ≥ Kˆt(δ), then xh = Qc − Ki, where Ki = f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)). Here,
µ = 0, Qc = D((1− ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf ), pC = (1− ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf ,
qhcf = 0, Kcf = Qc −Kt, Kdf = Qd +Kt.
(b) If QAc ≤ Kt < QTc , then Qc = Kt, pC = S ′(Kt), f
′(Ki)
ν
= κd + δ, µ = ξ =
S ′(Kt)− κd − δ − rf , qhcf = 0, Kcf = 0, Kdf = Qd +Kt.
4. δˆ(Kt) ≤ δ < δ¯(Kt)
In this case, the Clean country exports in state h its excess supply to the Dirty
country. λ¯ = 0, λ > 0, η′ = 0, µ¯ ≥ 0, µ = 0, ξ > 0. So xh ≤ Kt. The threshold
value of δ¯(Kt) such that renewable export is equal to the transmission capacity
(Ki = Qc +Kt) is δ¯(Kt)|xh=Kt = f
′(Ki)
ν
− κd, where f ′(Ki) = f ′(D((pc(Kt)) +Kt).
(a) If 0 < Kt < QAc , renewable capacity will be determined by f
′(Ki)
ν
= κd + δ.
Therefore, xh = Ki − Qc. Qc = D((1 − ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf . qhcf = 0,
qhdf = Qd + Qc − Ki, Kcf = Qc − Kt, Kdf = Qd + Kt. The shadow value of
transmission in state h is µ¯ = 0 and in state l is ξ = κc − κd.
(b) If QAc ≤ Kt < QTc , then Qc = Kt, pC = S ′(Kt), f
′(Ki)
ν
= κd + δ, µ¯ = 0,
ξ = S ′(Kt)−κd−δ−rf , qhcf = 0, qhdf = Qd+Qc−Ki, Kcf = 0, Kdf = Qd+Kt.
5. δ¯(Kt) ≤ δ
In this case, the Clean country exports in state h up to the transmission capacity.
λ¯ = 0, λ > 0, η = 0, µ¯ > 0, µ = 0, ξ > 0. So f ′(Ki)
ν
< κd + δ, xh = Kt.
(a) If Kt < Qc, then Qc = D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki)), Qd = D(κd + δ+ rf ),
xh = xl = Kt, Ki = Qc + Kt, qhcf = 0, qhdf = Qd − Kt, Kcf = Qc − Kt,
Kdf = Qd +Kt, µ¯ = κd + δ − f ′(Ki)ν , ξ = κc − κd.
(b) If Qc ≤ Kt < Qd, then Qc = Kt, Qd = D(κd + δ + rf ), µ¯ = f ′(Ki)ν − κd − δ,
ξ = S ′(Kt)− κd − δ − rf , qhcf = 0, qhdf = Qd −Kt, Kcf = 0, Kdf = Qd +Kt.
(c) If Qd ≤ Kt < QTc = QTd , then Qc = Kt, Qd = Kt, µ¯ = ξ = S ′(Kt) − (1 −
ν)(κd + δ)− rf − f ′(Ki), qhcf = 0, qhdf = 0, Kcf = 0, Kdf = 2Kt.
The full results are shown in Figure A.5 and Table A.1.
A.8.1 Carbon emissions of constrained Clean-Dirty interconnection
Comparative statics can be derived with respect to the autarky level of emission, to see
how expanding transmission affect carbon emissions (Figure A.6 and Table A.2).
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Figure A.5: The optimal consumption level given different transmission capacity and carbon
price
Kt
δ0 δA δF δ¯(Kt)
QT
QA
I.1
I.2
I.3 I.4
II.1
II.2
II.3
Table A.1: Summary statistics of optimal consumption, capacity and emission levels in
Clean-Dirty interconnection
I.1 I.2 I.3 I.4
Qc D(κc + δ + rf ) D(κc + δ + rf ) D((1− ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf ) D((1− ν)κc + δ + rf + f ′(Ki))
Kcf Qc −Kt Qc −Kt Qc −Kt Qc −Kt
qhcf Qc −Kt Qc −Kt −Ki 0 0
Ki 0 f ′−1(ν(κc + δ)) f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)) Kt +Qc
Qd D(κd + δ + rf ) D(κd + δ + rf ) D(κd + δ + rf ) D(κd + δ + rf )
Kdf Qd +Kt Qd +Kt Qd +Kt Qd +Kt
qhdf Qd +Kt Qd +Kt Qd +Qc −Ki Qd +Qc −Ki
E Qc +Qd Qc +Qd − νKi Qc +Qd − νKi Qc +Qd − νKi
II.1 II.2 II.3
Qc Kt Kt Kt
Kcf 0 0 0
qhcf 0 0 0
Ki 0 f ′−1(ν(κd + δ)) 2Kt
Qd D(κd + δ + rf ) D(κd + δ + rf ) D(κd + δ + rf )
Kdf Qd +Kt Qd +Kt Qd +Kt
qhdf Qd +Kt Qd +Kt −Ki Qd −Kt
E Kt +Qd Kt +Qd − νKi ν(Qd −Kt) + (1− ν)(Kt +Qd)
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Figure A.6: Change in carbon emissions with respect to autarky Net emission level ∆E =
E(Kt)− EA. The values for each range are listed in Table A.2.
Kt
δ0 δA δF δ¯(Kt)
QT
QA
∆E = 0
∆E = 0
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
(h)
(i) (j)
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Table A.2: Net carbon emission levels of constraint Clean-Dirty interconnection
∆E ⋛ 0 ∂∆E
∂Kt
(a) D((1− ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf )−D(κc + δ + rf )− νK¯(F (ν(κd + δ))− F (ν(κc + δ))) > 0 = 0
(b) D((1− ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf )−D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f
′(Ki))
−νK¯(F (ν(κd + δ))− F (f ′(Ki)))
> 0 = 0
(c) D((1− ν)κc + νκd + δ + rf )−D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f
′(Ki))
−νK¯(F (ν(κd + δ))− F (f ′(Ki)))
< 0 = 0
(d) D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f
′(Ki)(Qc +Kt))−D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki)(Qc))
−νK¯(F (f ′(Ki)(Qc +Kt))− F (f ′(Ki)(Qc)))
< 0 < 0
(e) Kt −D(κc + δ + rf ) > 0 > 0
(f) Kt −D(κc + δ + rf ) + νf ′−1(ν(κc + δ)) > 0 > 0
(g) Kt −D(κc + δ + rf )− νK¯(F (ν(κd + δ))− F (ν(κc + δ))) > 0 > 0
(h) Kt −D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki))− νK¯(F (ν(κd + δ))− F (f ′(Ki))) > 0 > 0
(i)a Kt −D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki))− νK¯(F (ν(κd + δ))− F (f ′(Ki))) ≷ 0 > 0
(j) (1− ν)(Kt −D((1− ν)(κc + δ) + rf + f ′(Ki)))− νKt < 0
> 0
if ν < 0.5
a In case (i), ∆E can be positive or negative depending on the value of Kt and δ. For a given δ, there exist
a threshold Kˆt, such that for Kt < Kˆt, ∆E < 0, otherwise > 0.
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